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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis will be to inquire into
the nature of symbolic imagery and to produce three dimen
sional symbolic figures incorporating etchings and etched
plates. I will test my images with several theories of sym
bolic or imaginative thought and I will test these theories
with examples from my supply of symbolic images .
Visual metaphor and visual humor are the most cons
tant features in my work. I invent and discover symbolic
jokes and comparisons with the help of my growing supply of
found images. Until a few months ago all of my imagery was
presented two dimensionally . I would collect photographs or
factual drawings of parts of the human figure, faces, facial
expressions, articles of clothing, and commonplace objects
which I would combine freely to form hybrid or composite figu
res. When one of these combinations would trigger an idea which
interested me I would work it out as a line drawing or etching.
Recently I began to supplement my collection of
found images with found objects and casts of objects, faces
or parts of the human figure. I combined these to form meta
phors and jokes similar to those which I had developed earlier
in two dimensions. The most inventive aspect of these figures,
as with my drawings and etchings, is the unexpected fitness of
the objects I choose to combine.
VFor my thesis project I set myself the problem of
transforming three of my linear etchings into three dimen
sional figures incorporating intaglio prints and etched plates.
The techniques I've combined in these figures fall
into three categories. First, whenever I needed a two dimen
sional image I used an intaglio print or etched copper plate.
Second, I often stretched or folded thin copper plates or
printed felt to form three dimensional shapes. Third, I used
found objects or plaster gauze casts of hands, faces, and
objects. To strengthen inner structures I used wood, wire
screening and fiberglass cloth. To create a tough outer shell
over fragile castes and objects I used polyester resin.
Although I became involved in a lot of changes and
adjustments in the course of building each figure I could see
in retrospect that there had been or could have been a very
clear sequence of procedures. I will describe the series of
techniques employed in constructing each of my three dimen
sional figures as if I were giving instructions on how to
build a replica.
The physical techniques I use to print or construct
my images are easy to describe. The psychological techniques
I use to invent, select, and combine my images are more
elusive. Nevertheless I would like to try to explain them. In
order to do this I will seek out information about the mental
processes which generate the kind of images which interest me
vi
and the general themes and points of view which these images
suggest. The authors I will lean on most heavily will be
Ernst Cassirer, E.H. Gombrich, Irwin Panofsky, Rudolf Arnheim,
and Roger Schattuck. As these names suggest, I am interested
in the foggy boundary areas where the imagery of visual art
merges into and emerges out of the imagery of literature, and
supernatural! sm.
1.
CHAPTER I
METAPHORICAL SYMBOLISM
The word symbol can be defined in more than one
way. One of these definitions stretches to include mean
ings which are alien or antagonistic to my images while the
other contracts to admit only those meanings which are com
patible with them.
"The clash over (the meaning of the word symbol)...
is partly due to a divergence of philosophical
traditions in Western thought. The extension
of the word symbol to cover any kind of sign
can be traced in the Anglo-Saxon tradition from
Hobbes to Pierce and has lead to such coinages
as symbolic logic. Against this expansionist
tendency, the German Romantics and their French
successors stressed the religious connotations
of the term and wanted it restricted to those
special kinds of signs which stand for something
ineffable and untranslatable."!
The signs which would exclude my images are descri
bed by Dewey as having "a purely external reference. They
have meaning in the sense in which an algebraic formula or a
cipher has it."^ The restricted symbol which would Include
my images "functions within a complex network of matrices and
potential choices which can perhaps be explained up to a
1E.H. Gombrich, The Use of Art for the Study of
Symbols (penguin Books, 1969") p. 150
STohn Dewey, Art as Experience (Capricorn Books,
1934) P. 83
point but not translated into exact
Gombrich describes these matrices by comparing
them to a guessing game based on comparisons or metaphors:
"The task would be to guess the identity of a
person or thing through a series of appropria
te comparisons or emblems. The guesser would
ask the group in the know such questions as
"If he were a flower what would he be? Or
what would be his emblem as an animal?...
Clearly if he started to ask what kind of flo
wer might be the appropriate attribute and
were told that it might be a thistle a whole
range of people who are either jovial or
shrinking should be ruled out from the start.
Should he then be told that among animals his
symbol might be a bear, his prickliness would
take on a more specific character.
You might indeed compare each of these answers
to the indices of letters and numbers on the
sides of a very irregular map which combine to
plot a position. The psychological category of
bear-like creatures sweeps along a wide zone of
the metaphorical field and so does the category
of thistley creatures, but the two categories
are sufficiently distinct to determine an area
that can be further restricted by other plot-
tings . "3
Gombrich goes on to show how Freud's well known interpreta
tions of dream symbols like the aggressive male symbolism
of an image of a knife, tree trunk, or umbrella and the re
ceptive female symbolism of a cave, cupboard or oven pre
sent themselves as examples of this game of multiple matrix
matching and help to chart the area of the mind where the
symbol and the metaphor overlap one another.
"There is no difficulty in subsuming Freud's
^Gombrich, 1969 p. 152
concepts of symbolism under the ancient idea of
metaphor. If you accept my formulation that the
symbol represents the choice from a given set of
matrices of what is least unlike the referent to
be represented, that variety of objects that can
stand for sexual organs need cause us no surpri
se."4
The relationship of the symbol or metaphor to its
object, then, is based on partial or accidental resemblances.
Arnheim includes a quote from Braque in his discussion of
this kind of symbolic connection.
"Georges Braque advises the artist to seek the
common in the dissimilar. 'Thus the poet can say
the swallow knifes the sky and thereby makes a
knife out of a swallow'. It is the function of
metaphor to make the reader penetrate the concrete
shell of the world of things by combinations of
objects that have little in common but the under
lying pattern. Such a device, however, would not
work unless the reader of poetry was still alive,
in his own daily experience, to the symbolic or
metaphoric connotation of all experience and acti
vity. For example, hitting or breaking things
normally evokes the overtone of attack and des
truction. There is a tinge of conquest in all
rising - even the climbing of a staircase.
"-'
When Arnheim talks about "the symbolic or meta
phoric connotations of all
appearances" he suggests that the
words metaphor and symbol can be synonymous when the word
symbol designates analogical rather than logical relationships.
The two poles of the term symbol might be divided and descri
bed as the sign-symbol and the metaphor-symbol. These two
uses of the word symbol point to two distinct modes of thinking,
"Basing himself on his work with computers, (Ulric
^Gombrich, 1969 p. 168
-^Rudolf Arnheim, Art and Visual Perception (Univer
sity of California Press, 1954) p~. 435
Neisser) proposes to replace some of the older
distinctions between mental activities by the
two types of information processing he calls
sequential and multiple processing. Ordinarily,
he writes, there is a main sequence in progress
in human thought, dealing with some particular
material in step-by-step fashion. The main se
quence corresponds to the ordinary course of
consciousness, consciousness being intrinsically
single. But this main sequential operation of
what might be called logical thought is normally
accompanied by a complex orchestration of multi
ple operations which are in the nature of things,
infinitely richer though less precise that the
well focused sequential process... When this
multiplicity is mobilized and forced into cons
ciousness with all that feeling of richness and
elusiveness which goes with the abandonment of
the main sequence we come a little closer to a
psychological account of the experience of the
ineffable that the restrictionist claim to be the
hallmark of the symbol, because it vouchsafes us
a glimpse into vistas of meaning beyond the
reach of logic and convention.""
These two kinds of thinking point to a very impor
tant difference in function of the sign-symbol and that of the
metaphor-symbol. The sign-symbol seeks out the clearest most
precise single meaning with which it can identify itself. The
metaphor-symbol seeks out the image which evokes the richest
cluster of associated meanings. This difference is due to the
fact that the sign-symbol intends to convey information. A
multitude of possible, equally appropriate meanings would frus
trate this purpose.
The metaphor symbol, on the other hand, summons up
associations, attitudes and responses. A single unequivocal
6Gombrich, 1969 p. 155
5.
interpretation would frustrate this experience.
As words like association, attitude, and response
suggest, the metaphorical symbol tends toward an introverted
point of view. This characteristic, even more than its ten
dency to carry multiple meanings, determines the traits of
imaginative symbolism which Cassirer examines in his Philo
sophy of Symbolic Forms.
Like Gombrich, Cassirer sees two distinct modes
of thinking. He calls these the scientific empirical and
the mythical view. The differences between these two points
of view correspond to the differences between the symbolism
of signs and the symbolism of metaphors.
6.
CHAPTER II
MYTHICAL SYMBOLISM
Cassirer 's Philosophy of Symbolic Forms is full
of insights into the nature of these two distinct but co
existent modes of human thought which he calls the scienti
fic empirical view and the mythical view. The scientific
empirical view includes the signs of logical, sequential
thought whereas the mythical view underlies the metaphori
cal symbols of analogical, multiple thought processes. The
scope of the kind of thinking which Cassirer calls mythical
thinking is suggested by a short description of the Warburg
Library where Cassirer and Gombrich did much of their work
on symbolism.
"Cassirer listened attentively as (Dr. Saxle) ex
plained to him Warburg's intentions in placing books
on philosophy next to books on astrology, magic
and folklore and in linking the sections on art
with those on literature, religion and philosophy.
The study of philosophy was for Warburg inseparable
from that of the so-called primitive mind. Neither
could be isolated from the study of imagery in
religion, literature, and art."'
Due, perhaps, to Warburg's view of the close kinship
?Ernst Cassirer, The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms
Volume II Mythical Thought, (Yale University Press, 1929) p.iv
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of these various disciplines Cassirer bases his inquiry at
the source of the kind of thinking which underlies all ima
gery. He calls this mode of thought mythical consciousness.
He calls the products of this consciousness mythical figures
and mythical meanings. These mythical figures and meanings
show themselves to be very closely related if not identical
to the metaphorical symbols described by Gombrich.
In the course of his study Cassirer isolates the
peculiar view the mythical mind takes of the relationship
of the part to the whole, of cause and effect and of change.
"For our empirical comprehension the whole con
sists of its parts; for the logic of natural
science it results from them; for the mythical
imagination neither of these propositions appli
es; here there prevails a true indifference both
in thought and in practice, between the whole
and its parts. The whole does not have parts
and does not break down into them; the part is
immediately the whole and functions as such.""
Long before I had heard of Cassirer 's study of
mythical thinking I had found that certain fragments of
figures or faces cut out of magazines had an unexpected po
wer to exist as independent wholes or to express or carica
ture an entire face, figure or gesture. Claes Oldenburg men
tions the same phenomenon in an interview about his work:
"Fragments have always interested me. I think one
of the big differences between the artist's vision
and, if there is such a thing, a normal person's
vision is that artists tend to see in fragments.
^Cassirer, Mythical thought p. 49
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They tend to take a part of the lamp, a part of
the telephone, a part of the ashtray and make a
whole out of that and ignore the rest. I mean
they tend to be very partial in their looking.
What I wanted to do in the early fragments, for
example in The Store which has a lot of fragments
from advertisements, was to limit the subject
matter to things that interested me and that I
could compose into a new whole. So I always
thought of seeing as basically a fragmentary acti
vity. If I walked down the street I would only
see certain things and I wanted to be true to
that vision. Fragments are also good because
they suggest what's between, you know, and so a
little piece of something suggests the whole of
it.
In an essay on picture reading Gombrich suggests
that there might be a physical reason for this "tendency to
see in fragments" which would be by no means limited to ar
tists .
"...eye movements can be filmed and fixation points
plotted on pictures. These records confirm. . .that
reading a picture is a piecemeal affair that starts
with random shots and these are followed by the
search for a coherent whole. Consider if we had
to read a statue blindfolded."10
Whatever the reason for it, the point remains that
the mythical mind does not see a stable relationship between
a whole object and its various parts. Myth feels free to de
tach the parts it wants and to consider them wholes or to at
tach them to other things to form new wholes.
"Things which come into contact with one another
in the mythical sense - whether this contact is
taken as a spatial or temporal contiguity or as
a similarity however remote .. .have fundamentally
^Jeanne Siegel How to Keep Sculpture Alive In and
Out of A Museum An Interview With Claes Oldenburg (Arts Maga-
zine Sept-Oct. 1969) P-30
E.H.Gombrich, Meditations on a Hobby Horse
(Phaidon Publishing Inc. Connecticut, 1963) p. 153
ceased to be a multiplicity; they have acquired
an essential unity... The relations which myth
postulates are not logical relations in which
those things which enter into them are at once
differentiated and linked; they are a kind of
glue which can somehow fasten the most dissimi
lar things together. "11
This adhesive quality is as much a feature of my
fragments of figures and faces as is their ability to detach
themselves or disassemble. I found that they tended to attach
themselves to one another very easily on the basis of the
slightest similarities. They would sometimes come together as
visual puns because of similarities of shape or they would
join to dramatize a simple event suggested by the cliches or
symbolic meanings to which each fragment might refer. Some
times they combined to form caricatures, hybrids, and agglome
rations of cliches.
The pleasure that certain artists take in collect
ing and combining different kinds of objects seems symptomatic
of this mythical stickiness. They produce a very inclusive,
pluralistic kind of art which gladly accepts and unites images
and materials from libraries, laboratories, museums, depart
ment stores, churches, factories, and so on.
Their disinclination to make distinctions between
categories of objects corresponds to another characteristic of
the mythical point of view which Cassirer calls "polysynthetic . "
i:LCassirer, Mythical Thought p. 63
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"If scientific thought wishes to describe and ex
plain reality it is bound to use Its general me
thod, which is that of classification and systemi-
zation. Life is divided into separate provinces
which are sharply distinghished from one another.
The boundaries between species, families, genera
- are fundamental and ineffaceable. But the pri
mitive mind ignores and rejects them all. Its
view of life is a synthetic, not an analytic one.
Life is not divided into classes and subclasses.
It is felt as an unbroken continuous whole which
does not admit of any clean-cut and trenchant dis
tinctions. The limits between the different sphe
res are not seen as insurmountable barriers; they
are fluent and fluctuating. There is no specific
difference between the various realms of life.
Nothing has a definite, invariable, static shape."12
Cassirer goes on to suggest that the boundaries
between objects appear so unstable to the mythical mind that
one object can be transformed into another. This mythical law
of metamorphosis contrasts sharply with the scientific approach
to change.
"When scientific thinking considers the fact of
change it is not essentially concerned with the
transformation of a single thing into another:
on the contrary, it regards this transformation
as possible and admissible only insofar as it is
based on certain functional relations and deter
minations which can be regarded as valid indepen
dently of the mere here and now. Mythical "meta
morphosis", on the other hand is always a record
of an individual event - a change from one con
crete material form into another. "13
This transformation or metamorphosis is obvious in
my clearest metaphors. The remark by Braque which was quoted
earlier that "the poet says the swallow knifes the sky and
12Cassirer, Mythical thought p. 8l
13Cassirer, Mythical thought p. 47
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thereby makes a knife out of a swallow" shows the close re
lationship between metaphor and metamorphosis. Likewise,
like the table-woman or the chair-man could also be called
metamorphoses. "Woman is table" (figure 6) could be unders
tood as "woman becomes table." To represent an object as
emerging out of or merging into another object could be
taken as a device for condensing the process of metamorpho
sis into a single image. A less obvious example of meta
morphosis might be the large white figure and golf ball
(figure 7). Here the shape and placement of the object sug
gests such a strong similarity to a host of other objects
that it could be expected to transform itself into those
other objects in the mind of the viewer.
The large white figure (figure 7) is obviously a
caricature of a female figure. But she is being held like
a baby and in shape she resembles both an insect larva and
a leg of lamb. In general she suggests objects associated
with infantilism or atavism.
This figure, like all of my images, demonstrates
all three main mythical techniques. They all began as parts
or fragments of wholes which grew together to form new wholes
and they are all in the process of transforming themselves
into other objects either physically or psychologically.
12
I would like to underline the fact that these
characteristics of mythical techniques depend upon an intro
verted experience or point of view. It is the internal,
psychological image, not its concrete physical counterpart
In the external world which has the flexibility required for
mythical behavior. Think for example of how clearly the
images of the dream, that most introverted of all familiar
experiences display the traits of mythical consciousness.
Consider the dreams subjective, introverted gaze
and the dreamer's passive suspension of his disbelief. To
dream, as to mythical consciousness, the things of the world
are so fluid that they melt into one another, so unstable
that parts of each image can be detached and transplanted to
any other image, so adhesive that one thing sticks to another
at the most accidental contact, and so interchangeable that
anything can be transformed into anything else.
But is instability the only principle or law by
means of which the elements of mythical thinking fall apart ,
stick together or replace one another? Are mythical choices
of what to add, what to subtract or what to substitute com
pletely arbitrary? Is any and every part of an object equally
competent to stand for the whole? Can any object be fused to
or transformed into any other object whatsoever with the same
13
conviction? Is mythical consciousness so passive that it
makes no choices or distinctions at all but merely seizes
upon anything which happens to fall into its field of vision?
Speaking for my own images I would simply say no
to these questions. Cassirer implies the same answer in his
explanation of what it is that captivates the mythical ima
gination.
14.
CHAPTER III
PHYSIOGNOMIC SYMBOLISM
"What myth primarily perceives are not objective
but physiognomic values .. .Whatever is seen or felt
is surrounded by a special atmosphere - an atmos
phere of joy or grief, of anguish or excitement,
of exultation or depression. Here, we cannot speak
of "things" as dead or indifferent stuff. All ob
jects are benignant or malignant, friendly or ini
mical, alluring and fascinating or repellent and
threatening. '!l4
I want to concentrate on the fact that the term
physiognomic refers to the face and to facial expression. In
its narrower sense physiognomic perception reads facial con
figurations into nonhuman forms like rocks and clouds. It
has the mythical capacity to accept a single feature like the
eye as a whole face but it does insist that the thing which is
experienced must somehow suggest the physical form of a face
or one of its features .
"The automatic recognition of an object like the
face is dependent on the two factors of resem
blance and biological relevance. The greater the
biological relevance an object has for us the more
we will be attuned to its recognition - and the
more tolerant will therefore be our standards of
formal correspondence. 'rl5
Ernst Cassirer, An Essay on Man (Yale University
Press, 19443 p. 76
-^Gombrich, Meditations on a Hobby Horse, p. 5
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In its broader sense, physiognomic perception
reads facial expression into nonhuman forms like shapes,
colors, textures, landscapes or still lifes which do not resem
ble the physical form of a face.
"The poet can speak of smiling skies because he
lives in a world which can be divided into things
which smile and things which frown. From this
point of view metaphors are not primarily transfer
red meanings, linkages established. They are indi
cators of linkages not yet broken, pigeonholes wide
enough to encompass spring sky and smile-
What we call the expressive character of sounds,
colors and shapes is nothing more than this capa
city to evoke physiognomic reactions . "1
While physiognomic values in the narrow sense are
evident in many of my images (figure 4), physiognomic values
in the broad sense are basic to the nature of metaphor. In
order to present both kinds of physiognomic perception in
their simplest clearest form Gombrich goes beneath the earliest
most primitive metaphorical expressions of children or primitive
adults to find examples of animal behavior which seem to corres
pond to human physiognomic reactions.
"If you remove an egg from a sea gull's nest and
put it nearby it will retrieve it. It will also
retrieve other round objects - pebbles or potatoes,
if they are sufficiently close in shape and touch
to the egg - but it will leave angular and soft
shapes untouched. For the gull, the class of egg
like things is larger than our class of eggs. Its
filing system is a little too wide, which makes
errors possible but not likely in the wild state.
It is on this range of classification that the
^Gombrich, Meditations on a Hobby Horse, p. 48
16
scientist plays when he wants to deceive the gull.
He cannot make eggs which would answer his own
definition, to be sure, but he can make eggs which
answer the gull's definition and study the bird's
reaction to the image or counterfeit.
...N. Tinbergen made dummies of sticklebacks to
probe the reactions of the male fish. The natura
listic dummy does not impress it much, unless it
is red, but the caricature with plenty of red arou
ses a violent reaction. Indeed, there are cases
when dummies arouse more reaction than the real
thing - they exhibit what are called the "releasers"
in a purer, more recognizable form than life situa
tions ever provide. But life also plays its tricks,
particularly on animals in captivity. Tinbergen ' s
sticklebacks always postured in their aquarium
when red mail trucks passed by the window at some
distance, for to their brains red stands for danger
and rivalry. "17
The sea gull's reaction to all egg shaped objects
and the stickleback's reaction to the color red demonstrate
the nonlogical nature of similar human responses and categories.
They also underline the point that "all image-making is rooted
in the creation of substitutes . "1 These dummies or substi
tutes "are not imitations of an object's external form but ra
ther an imitation of certain relevant aspects."
"The test of the image is not its lifelikeness but
its efficacy within a context of action. It may be
lifelike if that is considered to contribute to its
potency, but in other contexts the merest schema
will suffice, provided it retains the efficacious
nature of the prototype. It must work as well or
better than the real thing. "19
A clear example of such an image might be found in
my Shoe Face object (figure 2). The naturalistic mouth inserted
17Gombrich, Art and Illusion (Princeton University
Press I960) pp. 101, 102
^Gombrich, Meditations on a Hobby Horse, p. 9
19Gombrich, Art and Illusion, p. 110
17.
into the opening of the shoe transforms the shoe into a
face and the pair of gromits nearest the toe of the shoe
Into eyes. They fall into the class of eyelike objects
because they "look" at you. They can be accepted as images
of actual eyes because they release a similar response.
But Gombrich is careful to point out that we do
not react to these minimum images with the inflexibility
and predictability of animals.
"We are not simple slot machines which begin
to tick when coins are dropped into us, for,
unlike the stickleback, we have what psycho
analysts call an
"ego"
which tests reality
and shapes the impulses from the id. And so
we remain in control while we half surrender
to counterfeit coins, to symbols and subs
titutes. Our twin nature, poised between
animality and rationality, finds expression
in that twin world of symbolism with its will
ing suspension of disbelief."20
Nevertheless, the sea gull's reaction to round
shapes and the stickleback's reaction to the color red seem
to be primitive forms of the categories and responses which
lead in man to metaphorical or symbolic imagery. The sea
gull's mistake in particular seems to be a rudimentary form
of paronymy. According to Muller, "the phenomenon of paronymy,
or the use of the same word or shape to convey a host of enti
rely different
images"21 might serve as a link between animal
reactions and the mythical or metaphorical imagination.
20Tbid. p. 102
21Cassirer, Mythical Thought, p. 35
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Paronymy is obvious in the drawings of young
children. Kubie suggests that their poverty of vocabulary
forces them to use one shape or word to carry a variety of
meanings. c Children typically use a circular shape which
they modify with simple lines to symbolize a man, the sun,
a tree, or a flower. There is no end to the number of ob
jects which can be compared to a circle and consequently to
each other. The circle serves as the basis of the partial
resemblances essential to paronomy and to myth and metaphor -
All of this places the mythical or metaphorical
imagination in the part of the mind where more primitive
modes of consciousness color more recently evolved mental
activities. It tends toward the twilight areas of the mind
where vestiges of animal reaction and childish response lie
in the shadows behind the words of more advanced, differen
tiated forms of thinking. It can hardly defend itself against
the charge that it has a regressive, primitive aspect. But
it has a progressive aspect as well.
"Culture is based on man's capacity to create un
expected
substitutes,"
says Gombrich. "The pos
sibility of metaphor testifies to the mind's ca
pacity to perceive and assimilate new experiences
as modifications of earlier ones, of finding equi
valences in the most desperate phenomena and subs
tituting one for the other". 23
22Lawrence Kubie, Neurotic Distortion of the Creative
Process (University of Kansas Press, 1958) p. 42
23Gombrich, Art and Illusion, p. 103
19.
CHAPTER IV
COMIC SYMBOLISM
Like dream and myth, dream and wit are one process
according to Freud. Most of the techniques of the myth and
the metaphor correspond to Freud's techniques of the joke.
Myth, metaphor and joke seek the common in the dissimilar.
All three think in images, which are by definition, rooted in
the formation of substitutes. All three tend to carry double
or multiple meanings and tend, as a result, to be ambivalent
or ambiguous. "Symbolism", says Freud, "Is not peculiar to
dream but is characteristic of unconscious ideation. . .and it
is to be found in folklore and in popular myths, legends,
linguistic idioms, proverbial wisdom, and current jokes to a
more complete extent than in the dream. "^
It is the joke rather than the dream which generates
and selects my images. Perhaps it is characteristic for visual
wit to present images in a wordlike way. When I say wordlike I
do not refer to the "true classical style in writing which requir
ed that a work have one clear, logical meaning in each context. "25
2^Sigmund Freud, Standard Edition of the Complete
Works of Sigmund Freud, Volume V, Interpretation of dreams,
1905 (Hogarth Press, London, i960) p. 351
25Roger Schattuck, The Banquet Years p. 36
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I refer rather to the kinds of words which like dream sym
bols "have more than one or even several meanings and, as
with Chinese script, the correct interpretation can only be
arrived at in each occasion from the context." The word
like visual images I seek out correspond to the kinds of
words sought out by the symbolist poets. "For the symbolist
poets,"
say Roger Schattuck, "language was endowed with a
mystery of meaning which increased with the number of dif
ferent directions in which each word could point...The pun,
then, with its argus eyes had been raised to the status of
a legitimate literary method."2"
My visual images function nearly enough like words
to be used as examples of Freud's techniques of the joke.
For example, "condensation, the telescoping of a whole series
of ideas into a single pregnant image, is the essence of wit,"2?
says Gombrich, paraphrasing Freud. The female figure (figure 7)
who Is also a baby and a larva, and the golf ball which is
also an egg, a dropping, or an internal organ are very clear
examples of condensation.
This same female figure displays the technique of
modification. The caricaturing of body parts in this figure -
the tiny hand and foot and the inflated mouth and torso -
demonstrates what Bergson calls "the added element of exaggera-
2^Ibid.
27Gombrich, (1963) p. 130
21.
tion, a disproportion in detail that can, if skillfully
executed, suggest both sympathy and mockery."28
Multiple use of the same material is a common de
vice in my work, (figure 8). Roger Schattuck mentions
"that frequent use of strict symmetry and re
petition for the purpose of obtaining a comic
effect. The use of twins, the repetition of
situations, the constant mannerisms in the be
havior of a person, are all favorite "ornamen
tal" devices in comedy because they uncover me
chanical order - that is, lifelessness - in
life, which is precisely what Henri Bergson
described as the business of all humor... In
fact, Bergson has maintained in his book on
laughter that what strikes us as comical is the
discovery of mechanical aspects in the behavior
of people. On the other hand, inanimate ob
jects often seem uncannily alive. "29
The Shoe Face (figure 4) is not only an example
of condensation - the economical telescoping of a shoe and
a face - but also a clear example of Bergson's insight into
the tendency of wit to see the human In the inanimate and
vice versa.
Perhaps this tendency of wit to "seek out mechani
cal aspects in the behavior of people" helps to explain why
"the mid-nineteenth century brought an upsurge of painting
that provoked laughter or
grimace."30 It might be more than
coincidental that the mechanical age has co-existed with "a
pervading note of
humor" in painting and writing. This appe
tite of wit for mechanical behavior might also explain why I
28Schattuck, p. 32
29Arnheim, p. 137
30schattuck, p. 31
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choose my motifs from the stereotypes of advertising and my
techniques from technical illustration and model making.
Since all of my images are at once jokes, metaphors,
mythical figures, and symbols I see no way or reason to se
parate their comic aspects from their mythical aspects. If
there are larger themes underlying my family of images my
jokes are no less symptomatic of these themes than are my
myths and metaphors.
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CHAPTER V
SYMPTOMATIC SYMBOLS
Are the crowds of metaphorical figures which make
up my family of images symptomatic of certain basic themes
and tendencies? Can they be tested for what Panofsky calls
intrinsic meaning?
"Intrinsic meaning or content is apprehended by
ascertaining those underlying principles which
reveal the basic attitude of a nation, a class,
a religion, or philosophical persuasion which
has been unconsciously qualified by one persona
lity and condensed Into one work. "31
Panofsky goes on to explain what kind of unders
tanding the interpretation of this intrinsic meaning requires.
"To grasp these principles (of intrinsic meaning)
we need a mental faculty comparable to that of a
diagnostician - a faculty which cannot be better
described than by the discredited term "synthetic
intuition"
which might be better developed in a
layman than in an erudite scholar. "32
But how can the suspicions and assertions of what
ever passes for "synthetic intuition" be tested or controlled?
"The controlling principle for the interpretation
of intrinsic meaning (should be) the history of
31Erwin Panofsky, Studies in Iconology (Harper and
Row, New York, 1939) p. 12
32-rhld -
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cultural symptoms or symbols in general. (This
requires) insight into the manner in which under
varying historical conditions essential tenden
cies of the human mind were expressed by certain
themes and concepts. "33
Because it is very evident in my own images and
in the images of contemporary painting in general and because
I have found a variety of historical clues to its significan
ce I would like to examine the "intrinsic meaning" of the
motif of dismemberment.
George Digby has written about the dismemberment
theme in connection with the work of Henry Moore. Although
my work could hardly bear less resemblance to Moore's sculp
ture it does share one trait in common with it. We both pre
sent human figures in which "the most highly developed human
parts - the head, the hands, the feet, are atrophied or ampu
tated, (figures 3, 6, 7).
Digby presents three ancient myths as evidence of
the connection he suspects between the symbol of dismember
ment and the idea of rebirth. In each of these myths there is
"the idea of the resurrection of something superior from the
destruction and sacrifice of what had gone before." In both
the Greek myth of Dionysus and the Egyptian myth of Osiris the
god in question is dismembered and in both myths something
grows or is erected over the scattered fragments of each god's
33ibid. p. 15
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body. Here the dismemberment theme seems to correspond to
the idea of growing a new tree from a branch broken from
an old tree rather than to an idea of purely destructive
mutilation. A similar idea seems to motivate the Tibetan
Rite of Chod which demands that the initiate imagine him
self being ripped asunder in order to effect a reorienta
tion of his personality.
In all three of these myths "the energies and func
tions which will have to shape themselves anew...must first
be disintegrated - shaken apart and scattered before they can
be reunited and integrated as a new whole... The dismemberment
theme,"
says Digby, "is part of a drama of regression, of
reversion to primal roots and of possible regeneration and
rebirth. "^
Erich Neuman presents an ancient myth of creation
which states that "before the world was created with its fa
miliar figures, fragments came into being - arms, heads, eyes,
torsos etc. - without the interconnections which appear only
at a later birth. "35 This myth not only compliments Digby 's
collection of myths of dismemberment but also serves as a
kind of self-portrait of the mythical imagination. It is the
clearest of examples of the mythical belief in the detacha-
bility of attributes and the ability of these detached attri-
3 George Digby, Meaning and Symbol (Faber and
Faber unlimited 1954) p. 153
3->Erich Neuman, Art and the Creative Unconscious
(Pantheon Books, New York, 1959) p. 119
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butes to transform themselves into new wholes.
I'm not equipped to accept or reject any of these
interpretations of the theme of dismemberment. I can only
base my suspicions on what I am conscious of in my own ima
gery and on what I have gathered from the theories of Cassi
rer, Freud and Gombrich.
In my imagery I use two different kinds of dismem
berment which relate to two distinct but related ideas. The
first is dismemberment by fragmentation or amputation in which
the whole is simply cut up into its component parts. Once
they are detached from the whole these parts are free to join
other fragments to form new wholes. In this device dismember
ment is clearly a preliminary to change or metamorphosis, (fig
ures 3, 6). The second device is dismemberment by atrophy
or, more precisely, by distortion, (figure 7) Here, I do not
detach parts from the whole but rather reduce those parts
which I want to understate and enlarge those parts which I
want to overstate. In this case I have reduced the more
highly developed human parts like the head, the hands, and the
feet and enlarged the vegetative body parts like the torso.
It might be more than a coincidence that I have used this kind
of dismemberment in the white female (figure 7) in order to
make a caricature of what Kenneth Clark would call a "vegetable
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Venus, "3e> a term he uses to describe a female stereotype
which suggests man's relationship to animal life, to plant
life and to earth. My exaggerated "vegetable Venus" is in
the process of regressing to the embryo or further still to
the egg or seed. The egg will then presumably become some
thing new. This device of dismemberment by atrophy seems,
like the device of dismemberment by fragmentation, to pre
sent itself as a preliminary to change or metamorphosis or
in other words to rebirth.
Both Digby and Neumen see the theme of dismember
ment as typical not only of certain individual artists but of
contemporary art in general.
"Certain Symbols are met in the psyche," says
Digby. When a person reaches a point where he
can't go forward or maintain himself. Then the
unconscious gives up images that indicate that
something within him is turning back in search
of a new departure - a deep place on which to
build again. . .The occasional feeling after
embryonic forms (in contemporary art) doesn't
reflect the professed aims of the times but it
may reflect an unconscious attitude - the
shadow of a new point of view which is rising
into consciousness . "37
Neuman 's interpretation of the fragmentation and
atavism in contemporary art is very similar.
"The center of gravity in contemporary art has
shifted from consciousness toward the creative
matrix where something new is in preparation. "38
3^Kenneth Clark, The Nude, (Doubleday & Company Inc
New York, 1959)
Digby, p. 157
3Neuman, p. 126
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CONCLUSION
My inquiry has not lead to an unquestionable ex
planation of the nature of metaphorical imagery but it has
turned up some definite clues about the symbol's behavior,
its whereabouts in the mind and the circumstances under
which it is most likely to be conceived and developed.
In Chapter I, Metaphorical Symbolism, I have tried
to clarify the differences between the sign, or symbol which
conveys factual or literal meanings and the metaphor, or
symbol which evokes imaginative ; ambiguous meanings.
In Chapter II, Mythical Symbolism, I tried to show
how Cassirer 's analysis of the methods of imaginative thought
(which he calls mythical imagination) corresponds to the me
thods I use to discover and develop visual metaphorical images.
In Chapter III, Physiognomic Symbolism, I leaned
heavily on explanations by Cassirer and Gombrich which try to
account for the "expressive" or "emotional" nature of imagina
tive symbolism.
In Chapter IV, Comic Symbolism, I used parts of theo
ries of wit by Freud and Bergson to help substantiate my sus
picion that humor branches from the same root as myth and me
taphor.
In Chapter V, Symptomatic Symbolism, I made an
attempt to seek out attitudes and tendencies underlying the
theme of dismemberment which is one of my recurring images .
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This theme shows itself to be a kind of image of the process
of image making.
The psychological theories I studied about the
nature of metaphorical imagery provided me with very definite
hints about the nature of my own images and, in return, my
images presented themselves as evidence of the validity of
the theories I investigated.


FIGURE NUMBER ONE: THE SHIRT WOMAN
1. The silhouette of the figure was cut out of 3/8" plywood
and painted black.
2. The 10" x 10" etching of an image of an eye was glued to
the center of the lower half of the plywood silhouette
with Elmer's Glue-all.
3. The zipper components were drawn and etched on 20 gauge
copper sheeting, then cut out, inked, wiped and varnished.
4. The breastplates were hammered out of 20 gauge copper
sheeting and varnished.
5. The torso shapes were constructed from plaster gauze ban
dage casts taken from balloons ranging from
2" to 2 in
diameter.
6. These shapes were assembled, reinforced from the inside
with fiberglass cloth, and glued to the plywood silhouette
with epoxy cement.
7. A cotton shirt was dipped into clear polyester resin, fol
ded into the shapes I wanted, and allowed to dry.
8. Fiberglass cloth was adhered to the hidden surfaces of the
shirt with clear polyester resin.
9. The plaster gauze casts and the areas where they were join
ed to the shirt were covered with Sears Plastic Body Filler
and sanded smooth.
10. The figure was painted with white polyester finishing resin,
While the resin was still wet it was dusted with white tal
cum powder which gave it an even dull finish.
11. The zipper shapes were assembled and glued into place with
epoxy cement.


FIGURE NUMBER TWO: THE SHOE FACE
1. A 30 gauge copper plate was coated with soft wax etching
resist .
2. A disassembled sneaker was placed face down upon the wax
ed side of the copper and run through an etching press.
3. The texture of the cloth and the metal gromits pulled away
the wax resist leaving a clear reversed image of the sneak
er in exposed copper.
4. The copper was placed in a dutch mordant acid bath for two
hours in order to allow the acid to etch into the exposed
areas .
5. Since the copper had been embossed in reverse at the out
set in order to take an imprint of the sneaker's texture,
it now had to be run through the press again, this time
with the sneaker shapes behind rather than on top of the
etched surface of the copper in order to make a positive
embossed image of the sneaker.
6. A partial cast of a face was made from plaster gauze banda
ges, reinforced from the inside with fiberglass cloth, co
vered with Sears Plastic Body Putty and sanded smooth.
7. The copper image of the disassembled sneaker was cut out,
reassembled, and glued together around the face cast with
epoxy cement.


FIGURE NUMBER THREE: THE TABLE WOMAN
4.
5.
The tablecloth shape was made from a 2' by 3' rectangle
of wire window screening folded to conform to the shape
it would take if it were cloth.
The female shoulder shapes were constructed from plaster
gauze bandage casts taken from balloons ranging from 2"
to 2' in diameter.
The hands emerging from the table are plaster gauze casts
of actual hands and the hands emerging from the plate were
caste from all-purpose polyester resin poured into plaster
gauze casts of actual hands.
The wire screen table cloth and plaster gauze shoulders
were covered with fiberglass cloth for strength.
The hands holding the tray and the hands emerging from the
tray were fastened into place with screws and epoxy ce
ment .
The junctures between the table and emerging figure forms
were covered over with Sears Plastic Body Filler and san
ded smooth.
The tray and its emerging hands were painted with white
polyester finishing resin.
The surface of the tablecloth is felt. The dark checks
were printed from an etched copper plate and glued into
place individually with Elmer's Glue-all. Felt suits this
purpose very well since it can be stretched to conform to
a warped surface.
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